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T he comparable worth theory has emerged as one of the most controversial subjects in the 
area of employment rights in this 
decade. This article will focus upon the 
developing concept of comparable 
worth in sex-based wage discrimination 
cases under Title VII of the Equal Rights 
Act of 1964. 1 Statistics indicate that in 
the last twenty years there has been an 
unprecedented gain in the number of 
women in the workforce. 2 However, 
despite anti-discriminatory regulation in 
payment of wages, the ratio of women's 
to men's median earnings has remained 
relatively unchanged since 1939.3 At 
every level of educational achievement, 
women's median earnings continue to 
lag far behind men's earnings. "On [the] 
average, whether college graduates or 
high school dropouts, women earned 
about 60 cents for every dollar their 
male counterparts were paid" in 1981.4 
Despite some inroads into male 
dominated fields,s the disparity in wages 
is largely attributable to the fact that the 
majority of women remain concentrated 
in "traditionally" female6 and lower 
paying occupations. 7 
The comparable worth theory is an 
attempt to redress the wage disparity 
that exists as a result of sex segregation in 
the workplace. This comparable worth 
doctrine has been defined as a 
"controversial concept under which a 
plaintiff might claim increased 
compensation on the basis of a 
comparison of the intrinsic worth or 
difficulty of their job with that of other 
jobs in the same organization or 
community. "8 
Wage discrimination cases can be 
brought under either Title VII or the 
Equal Pay Act. 9 In order to analyze 
comparable worth under Title VII, it is 
necessary to understand the relationship 
between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
and how they separately address wage 
discrimination. 
Equal Pay Act 
Enacted in 1963, the Equal Pay Act 
sought to provide legal remedies for 
victims of gender-based wage 
discrimination. The Act represented the 
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first step in acknowledging the growing 
pattern of women permanently in the 
workforce and the move to eliminate 
past paternalistic attitudes toward 
women.1O Intended as a "broad charter 
of women's rights in the economic 
field,"11 the Act is limited in scope to 
addressing wage discrimination. The 
well-known phrase "equal pay for equal 
work" is the thrust of the Act. However, 
it is well settled that the jobs to be 
compared need not be identical in all 
respects before the Equal Pay Act is 
applicableY "Equal work" has been 
judicially defined to ~ean that the jobs 
must be substantially similar.13 
In order to prove that a violation of 
the Act has occurred, the employee 
must show that "her salary was lower 
than that paid by the employer to 
employees of the opposite sex .. .for 
equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort and 
responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions."14 
Minor differences in the degrees of skill, 
effort or responsibility required for the 
performance of the job will not render 
the equal pay standard inapplicable. IS 
Application of this test necessarily 
requires a case-by-case analysis of the 
factual issues involved. The 
requirements of equal skill, effort and 
responsibility have been defined 
broadly enough to allow proof of any 
characteristic which makes one job 
harder than or qualitatively different 
from another. Skill includes such 
variables as the experience, training, 
education, and ability required for the 
job. 16 Effort includes mental or physical 
exertion. 17 Responsibility includes the 
degree of accountability and other 
matters which might reflect on the 
employee's importance or authority.18 
The Act specifically allows employers 
to maintain different wages for men and 
women in substantially equal jobs if 
payment is based on: (1) a seniority 
system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system 
that measures earnings by quantity or 
quality of production; or (4) a 
differential based on a factor other than 
sex. Thus, a prima facie showing of 
unequal pay for equal work may be 
rebutted by the employer proving that 
the payment of different wages is based 
on one of the affirmative defenses 
enumerated above. 
In keeping with the narrow scope of 
the Act, it is generally accepted that if 
the jobs being compared are not equal in 
content it is unnecessary to compare 
their skill, effort or responsibility. 19 
Specifically, the legislative history of the 
Equal Pay Act makes it clear that there is 
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to be no comparison of the skill, effort 
or responsibility of different jobs. In 
fact, a 1962 draft of the equal pay bill 
called for "equal pay for comparable 
work." The word "equal," however, 
was substituted for "comparable" so as 
to reduce the amount of latitude the 
word "comparable" allowed. 20 
While the Equal Pay Act took the first 
step in addressing wage disparities 
between men and womenr it does not 
offer relief in any circumstance except 
where the employer also employs a male 
to perform substantially equal work. 
The Equal Pay Act does not address "the 
problem of job segregation, and 
therefore does not provide a remedy for 
those women who are trapped in low 
paying, largely sex-segregated jobs."21 
At every level of 
educational 
achievement, 
women's median 
earnings continue to 
lag far behind 
men's earnings. 
Title VII 
In further recognition of the problems 
facing minorities in employment, 
Congress passed Title VII of the Equal 
Rights Act of 1964.22 It is interesting to 
note that at the time, the inclusion of sex 
in Title VII as a prohibited basis of 
discrimination was offered as a House 
floor amendment, without prior 
hearings or investigations, for the 
purpose of gaining opposition to Title 
VII and thus insuring its demise. 
Title VII encompasses a much 
broader range of discriminatory 
practices in employment. The central 
focus of these cases is whether an 
employer is treating some people less 
favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin.23 
Specifically as to wages, under Section 
703 (a)(l) of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, it is an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer "to 
discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such 
individual's ... sex .... "24 
Two distinct methods of establishing 
discrimination under Title VII are 
disparate treatment and disparate 
impact. The differences between 
disparate treatment cases and disparate 
impact cases set forth by the court in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States,2S are as follows: 
'Disparate treatment' .. .is the most 
easily understood type of 
discrimination. The employer 
simply treats some people less 
favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national Origm. Proof of 
discriminatory motive is critical, 
although it can in some situations 
be inferred from the mere fact of 
differences in treatment (citation 
omitted). Undoubtedly disparate 
treatment was the most obvious 
evil Congress had in mind when it 
enacted Title VII.... Claims of 
disparate treatment may be 
distinguished from claims that 
stress 'disparate impact.' The 
latter involve employment 
practices that are facially neutral in 
their treatment of different groups 
but that in fact fall more harshly 
on one group than another and 
cannot be justified by business 
necessity (citation omitted). Proof 
of discriminatory motive, we have 
held, is not required under a 
disparate impact theory. 
The disparate impact doctrine, 
aimed at covert intentional 
discrimination, 'was designed to 
insure more perfect realization of 
the beneficient purposes of Title 
VII by making plain that 
discriminatory consequences as 
well as discriminatory intent fall 
under the bank of this remedial 
legislation, and by providing a 
relatively easy burden of proof of 
discriminatory consequences to 
overcome difficulties that might 
normally obtain in proving 
discrimination in employment .... '26 
In order for a plaintiff to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under this 
theory, she need only prove the 
existence of "an employment policy or 
practice which, though facially neutral 
or even benign in actual purpose, 
nevertheless imposes a substantially 
disproportiona te burden upon a 
claimant's protected group as compared 
to a favored group within the total set of 
persons to whom it is applied. "27 For 
example, an employer might require that 
the applicant meet certain height and 
weight requirements in order to qualify 
for the job.2s Such a requirement may 
effectively exclude most females while 
not having the same impact on males. 
An employer may overcome a 
showing of disparate impact by showing 
that the different treatment is justified 
by a business necessity.29 Under the 
business necessity defense, the employer 
must show that the challenged 
requirment has a manifest relationship 
to the employment in question.3o 
Plaintiffs proceeding under a 
disparate treatment theory must show 
"proof of actions taken by the employer 
from which [the court] can infer 
discriminatory animus because 
experience has proved that in the 
absence of any other explanation, it is 
more likely than not that those actions 
were bottomed on impermissable [sex-
based] considerations. "31 As noted 
earlier, disparate treatment cases require 
direct or circumstantial proof of 
discriminatory motive, whereas no such 
proof of motive is required in disparate 
impact cases.32 
Once a plaintiff has shown a 
difference in treatment, the employer 
can rebut the inference of 
discrimination by showing a legitimate 
business reason for its action. If the 
defendant responds with a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the 
action, the plaintiff then has a chance to 
show that the proffered reasons are 
merely pretextuaP3 
While Title VII is arguably broad 
enough to encompass claims based on a 
comparable worth theory, until 1981 
such claims were not legally recognizable 
due to the judicial construction of the 
Bennett Amendment to Title VII. 
The Bennett Amendment 
The Bennett Amendment to Title VII 
provides that it is not unlawful "for an 
employer to differentiate upon the basis 
of sex in determining the amount of 
wages or compensation paid ... to 
employees of such employer if such 
differentiation is authorized by the 
provisions of...[the Equal Pay Act]."34 
The intent of the Bennett Amendment is 
to reconcile conflicts between the Equal 
Pay Act and Title VII and ensure that the 
Equal Pay Act would not be nullified.35 
Due to the lack of significant legislative 
history, courts differ on the effect of the 
Bennett Amendment. Some courts 
interpreted it as incorporating the equal 
pay standard of the Equal Pay Act into 
Title VII. As a result, a plaintiff cannot 
prove a violation of Title VII unless she 
can also prove that there was a violation 
of the Equal Pay Act. 36 
Courts later opined that the 
Amendment only incorporated the four 
affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay 
Act into Title VIp? 
Gunther: Opening the Door for 
Comparable Worth? 
In County of Washington v. Gunther,3s 
the Supreme Court resolved the 
uncertainty created by the Bennett 
Amendment. Respondents in Gunther, 
female prison guards in the female 
section of the Washington County 
Prison, alleged that wage disparity 
between male and female guards was the 
result of intentional sex discrimination. 
The primary problem 
with the 
comparable worth 
theory lies in 
defining the ttvalue" 
to assign to the 
work performed. 
The county had conducted a market 
survey which showed that the female 
guards should have been paid 95% of 
the wages of male guards based on their 
worth to the employer. Subsequent to 
the study, the county implemented the 
recommended wages for male guards 
but only paid female guards 70% of the 
wages paid to the male guards.39 
Respondents asserted that they did 
not have to meet the equal work 
standards of the Equal Pay Act because 
the Bennett Amendment should only 
incorporate the four affirmative 
defenses of the Act. The Court agreed, 
holding that the Amendment does not 
restrict Title VII cases to the equal pay 
for equal work standards. 40 
The Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs were seeking to show by direct 
evidence that they were victims of 
intentional discrimination and 
accordingly held that the plaintiffs 
should be permitted to proceed under 
the disparate treatment theory of Title 
VII. The Court recognized that its 
decision could be viewed as support for 
comparable worth claims, but 
specifically declined to reach the issue of 
that doctrine's viability under Title VII, 
stating that "respondents' claim is not 
based on the controversial concept of 
comparable worth."41 Thus, the debate 
continues; the Court appears to have 
broadened the contours of prohibitory 
sex-based wage discrimination under 
Title VII but has not yet identified its 
boundaries. 
The Post,Gunther Debate 
The Supreme Court seems to have 
opened the door to comparable worth 
claims under Title VII, but it is unclear 
whether that extends beyond cases in 
which plaintiffs can prove intentional 
discrimination. Without a clear 
mandate on the validity of comparable 
worth, lower courts continue to struggle 
with the precise parameters of a Title VII 
wage discrimination case. 
The court in Spaulding v. University of 
Washington,42 stated that Gunther's 
"recognition of intentional 
discrimination may well signal the outer 
limit of legal theories cognizable under 
Title VII. This conclusion is supported 
by considerations of precedent, 
prudence and judicial competence. "43 
Appellants in Spaulding, members of 
the faculty of the University of 
Washington School of Nursing, alleged 
that the University engaged in 
discriminatory compensation practices 
against them in comparison to male 
faculty members in other academic 
disciplines. In holding that the 
appellants failed to establish a prima 
facie case under the disparate treatment 
theory, the court stated that "evidence 
of comparable work, although not 
necessarily irrelevant in proving 
discrimination under some alternative 
theory, will not alone be sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case. "44 The court 
rejected the appellants' suggestion- that 
Gunther provided for a "comparability 
plus" test, requiring only some degree of 
job comparability plus some 
combination of factors including direct 
and circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory conduct and pay 
disparities. The court stated that 
"[s]uch an unwieldy test might allow 
plaintiffs to bolster inadequate showings 
of comparability with a confusing 
potpourri of 'plus factors,' plunging 
courts into standardless supervision of 
employer / employee relations. "45 
Similarly, in Power v. Barry County, 
Michigan,46 the court held that in the 
absence of an allegation of intentional 
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discrimination on the part of the 
employer to depress the wages of female 
prison matrons, a claim for comparable 
worth was not a viable independent legal 
theory under Title VII. The court stated 
that it "cannot and will not, evaluate 
different jobs and determine their worth 
to an employer or to society and then, 
on that basis alone, determine whether 
Title VII has been violated ... ".47 
The Power court noted that there are 
"inherent problems and other 
ramifications in making such a 
subj ective evaluation of the intrinsic 
worth of different jobs ... ".48 
The primary problem with the 
comparable worth theory lies in defining 
the "value" to assign to the work 
perfomed.49 Opponents of the theory 
believe that to take the value of a job out 
of the market where it is regulated by 
supply and demand and assign a value 
based on mathematical calculations will 
reek havoc on the economy. 50 
Comparable worth has even been 
analogized to Marx's socialist concepts 
of labor where all jobs are politically 
defined, mathematically related, 
measured values. 51 
Of course it is not surprising that the 
primary opponents to the theory are 
businessmen. While businessmen will 
argue that they base their compensation 
plans on market determinants, job 
evaluation studies are employed in 
business, industry and government. 52 
One such job evaluation study led to a 
court upholding a claim based on the 
comparable worth theory. The court in 
AFSCME v. State of Wash. 53 addressed a 
comparable worth claim in which the 
State of Washington had commissioned 
a comprehensive study of all 
government positions, comparing the 
pay differences between predominantly 
male and predominantly female 
positions. The study, conducted in 
1974, found 59 predominantly male 
classifications and 62 predominantly 
female classifications. 54 
The methodology used to value each 
employment classification was based on 
four factors: knowledge and skills, 
mental demands, accountability, and 
working conditions. The study revealed 
that the predominantly female 
classifications were compensated with 
an average salary of 20% less than 
predominantly male classifications of 
similar complexity and value. 55 
The conclusions of the study were 
affirmed by two governors, by a 
resolution of one of the two state 
personnel boards, and by amendment to 
the state's compensation statutes. 
However, although the study was 
6-Tht' La\\' Forum SjJring, 1985 
completed in 1974, no appropnatIon 
was passed to implement the 
comparable worth salary system 
developed pursuant to the study until 
after the AFSCME suit was filed in 
1983. Even then, the plan adopted was 
described by the court as providing 
"nothing more than a token 
appropriation of $1.5 million ... and a 
ten-year remedial" plan. 56 
The AFSCME court found that the 
state's failure to pay the plaintiffs their 
evaluated worth in accordance with the 
comparable worth study constituted 
discrimination in violation of Title VII 
under both the disparate treatment and 
disparate impact doctrines. 57 
Specifically, the court found that the 
state's system of compensation, while 
facially neutral, had a disparate impact 
upon employees in predominantly 
female job classifications. The state 
failed to demonstrate a legitimate and 
overriding business consider a tion 
justifying the policy. 58 In addition, the 
court found that the state's 
implementation and perpetuation of its 
system of compensation was intentional 
and resulted in unfavorable treatment of 
employees in predominantly female 
classifications. The discriminatory 
intent required by the disparate 
treatment theory was evidenced by the 
"deliberate perpetuation of an 
approximately 20% disparity in salaries 
between predominantly male and 
predominantly female job classifications 
with the same number of job evaluation 
points. "59 
Although the court stated at the 
beginning of its decision that AFSCME 
"is more accurately characterized [as] a 
straightforward 'failure to pay' case,"60 
than a comparable worth case, it 
represents the first reported decision in 
which liability has been imposed under 
Title VII for sex discrimination in 
compensation involving dissimilar jobs. 
AFSCME is also the first case in which 
a court has applied the disparate impact 
analysis to a compensation system. It is 
doubtful, however, whether 
jurisdictions that have rejected disparate 
impact analysis where an employer's 
subjective decision making is involved 
would consider it applicable to 
compensation systems based on job 
evaluation studies. 62 
The question of whether other courts 
will be persuaded by the AFSCME 
decision to embrace comparable worth 
analysis in Title VII wage discrimination 
cases was answered negatively by at least 
one court thus far. In Cox v. American 
Cast Iron Pipe Company,63 the Court 
stated that 
[t]he superficially plausible 
analysis in [AFSCME] (citation 
omitted) is fundamentally 
implausible. It is impractical and 
violative of market conditions to 
attempt to correct all disparity 
between the pay for so called 
"women's jobs" and the pay for so 
called "men's jobs" by stretching 
the Equal Pay Act or Title VII 
beyond their langauge. The correct 
remedy is to make sure that all jobs 
are open to both sexes.64 
The Cox court's opinion patterns the 
general reluctance of the courts to 
become involved in the subjective 
decision making process of evaluating 
dissimilar jobs based on their intrinsic 
value to the employer. 
Conclusion 
The civil rights of women in the area 
of employment-based wage discrimina-
tion are still unfolding. Business and 
governmental entities have conducted 
numerous job evaluation studies to 
determine the pay disparity between 
predominantly female and predominant-
ly male positions. It is anticipated that 
AFSCME represents only a single case in 
a wave of litigation based upon failure of 
an employer to implement a job 
evaluation study. Whether such claims 
are based upon a comparable worth 
theory or a disparate treatment theory of 
intentional discrimination for failure to 
implement the results of the study, the 
result will be the same under the 
majority's current Gunther interpreta-
tion. 
In the absence of a job evaluation 
study, I believe that the courts will 
continue to be reluctant, without 
evidence of intentional discrimination, 
to intervene in subjective market 
determinations made by employers in 
setting wages. Courts will find it 
difficult, if not impossible, within the 
limits of the judicial system and 
litigation practices to arrive at the 
essentially subjective value comparison 
of differing jobs within the workforce. 
The vestiges from past paternalistic 
policies and pay inequities will continue 
to pervade predominantly female 
positions until comparable worth is 
recognized as a viable independent 
theory or the market adjusts itself. 
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